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3 
1. Introduction 
Public opposition to infrastructure projects is nothing new. In the US in 19th century the construction of 
the Erie Canal faced thousand of complaints and lawsuits as a result of negative impacts from the 
project on local populations. What is new nowadays is that public opinion and engagement is able to 
stop, delay or modify the design of many infrastructure projects. Under previous forms of organisation 
of society, infrastructure projects could be executed even despite public protests. For example, Baron 
Haussmann changed the plan of Paris significantly by construction of new boulevards, which required 
demolition of existing housing for configuration of large boulevards. However, this infrastructure 
project would not be possible if Baron Haussmann would not have the power of Napoleon III behind 
him. Execution of such power is impossible nowadays and is not compatible with the principles of 
democracy. Nowadays, realisation of infrastructure projects requires public support and acceptance, 
and it is recognised that public and stakeholder engagement brings positive benefits if it is well 
organised.   
Public acceptance is closely connected with public participation, which is largely understood as 
democratic principles of inclusiveness and a right of people to participate in decision-making, which 
can affect their lives (Beierle and Cayford, 2002). Forms of public participation can vary largely, from 
provision of information through to ‘community empowerment’ where a community has full decision-
making power over resources and the process (International Association of Public Participation, 2004). 
Public acceptance is also a function of trust, which is closely related to stakeholders’ and the public’s 
experiences and perceptions. These are shaped by the details of how a project is planned and 
designed, and are also by the public’s earlier experiences with the relevant institutions’ approaches 
(e.g. whether their local knowledge was taken into account) and the outcomes of previous similar 
projects (e.g. in terms of experienced impacts on livelihoods and environmental quality). It is a cliché 
that it takes years to build trust and seconds to destroy it. 
Climate change threatens to have huge negative impacts on people and nature. Environmental NGOs 
increasingly understand the need for power lines to integrate renewables in the effort to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. TSOs increasingly understand the need for environmentally sensitive and 
socially legitimate development of infrastructure. In addition to the direct and ethical benefits in 
protecting nature and engaging with affected groups, TSOs understand the need to advance good 
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practice in these areas for public acceptability reasons - for the specific project in question and also to 
build trust (and thus public acceptability) for all subsequent development procedures involving the 
same institutions. BESTGRID will serve these needs, and demonstrate with a solid, scientific evidence 
base, which measures improve engagement, reduce impacts, improve perceptions, build trust and 
increase support. 
2. Background: five guiding principles 
“There is a long body of research into the issue of public support and opposition which in a nutshell 
suggests the importance of five sets of action in the course of project development: 
a. Very early involvement of stakeholders in the deliberative process.  
b. Clear and constant linking of the need for new infrastructure to the problems that the specific 
infrastructure project addresses. 
c. Complete transparency concerning all aspects of the project, including costs (to whom), benefits (to 
whom), design choices, involved actors, and environmental, economic, and health impacts. 
d. Concerted attention to minimize any environmental and health impacts. 
e. Sharing of the benefits that infrastructure brings to society with those that have to make 
compromises for the good of society.” 
Below these are re-ordered, given abbreviated titles (e.g. ‘need’) and briefly explained. 
a. ‘Need’ 
People who think their interests may be negatively affected by a project will, understandably, seek to 
question the need for that specific project. The solution is clear and constant linking of the need for 
new infrastructure to the problems that the specific infrastructure project addresses. 
b. Transparency’ 
Affected groups expect and demand to be able to understand who makes decisions affecting them, on 
what basis, and to be able to hold decision makers to account. Thus maximum transparency 
  
 
 
 
5 
concerning all aspects of the project is required, including costs (to whom), benefits (to whom), design 
choices, involved actors, and environmental, economic, and health impacts. This is necessary but 
insufficient: there must also be clear procedures in place for affected groups to engage, and to make 
their concerns heard. 
c. ‘Engagement’ 
Experiences shows there are strong benefits to public acceptability in very early involvement of 
stakeholders in the deliberative process. Engagement needs to then continue throughout planning and 
project phases, with methods suited to different stakeholders, and clarity on how their input will be 
(and has been) taken into account. All parties concerned (TSOs, Public Authorities, Stakeholders and 
the broader public) need a certain level of trust and need to be willing to contribute to the process and 
to collaborate and to take others points of views into account. Transparency as well as information are 
necessary prerequisites for successful participatory processes. Furthermore, sufficient resources 
(time, knowledge) are needed with both groups of actors – the ones who participate as well as the 
ones who offer participation.  
d. ‘Environment’ 
Public acceptability is increased where potentially affected groups understand that there will be 
concerted attention to minimizing any environmental and health impacts. This can be achieved 
through procedures (which should, in themselves, advance accountability and engagement) to take 
potential impacts into account and to specify actions to avoid or mitigate those impacts. 
e. ‘Benefits’ 
Local public acceptability will be low where affected populations feel they derive no benefit from the 
new infrastructure, for example where a power line passes overhead but is not needed for local 
electricity supply nor to support local generation capacity and jobs. This can be addressed by sharing 
of the benefits that infrastructure brings to society with those that have to make compromises for the 
good of society. 
 
3. Methodology 
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The goal of the monitoring framework is to collect evidence on which actions lead to success in 
addressing issues of public acceptance. The realization of the BestGrid project will allow collection of 
empirical data from the beginning of the pilot projects. These data can serve for development of 
recommendations for the policy-making process at the European and national levels on how to deploy 
further electricity transmission grids and to deal with public opposition. The recommendations can be 
also apply for replications of lessons learned under the BestGrid project in other EU member 
countries. Moreover, these recommendations will allow influencing of public discourse processes 
about deployment of electricity grids in Europe. 
The framework will include the following milestones. First, summary of what we currently know based 
on the literature review of renewable, non-renewable and transport infrastructure projects and 
expertise collected by Germanwatch and BirdLife. This will result in the list of actions for each guiding 
principle. We will discuss the actions, identified under historical cases, and the actions recommended 
by NGOs, to develop a list of actions to be recommended for pilot projects under the BestGrid project. 
Second, during the discussion with TSOs we will identify feedback on the proposed list of actions and 
identify which actions could be implemented under each concrete pilot project. This will be based on 
the feedback from TSOs regarding the previous experience with similar actions, available resources 
and feasibility of the action under concrete pilot project, and existing or probable barriers for 
implementation of the action. After the discussion we will be able to finalize the framework of guiding 
principles and actions. 
Ideally, this framework will contain one or more action for each guiding principle to be implemented 
universally through all pilot projects and one or more actions for each guiding principle, which will vary 
from pilot project to pilot project (Figure 1).  This will allow collection of evidence which of the guiding 
principles and actions really made difference in addressing the issues of public acceptance. 
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Figure 1: Framework of guiding principles and actions for all four pilot projects 
a. During the implementation of the pilot projects we aim to collect evidence about: 
b. Which guiding principles and actions were the most important to address the issues of public 
acceptance? 
c. Which were the challenges for implementation of these guiding principles and actions? 
d. What was the financial burden for the implementation of guiding principles? 
e. How much time did it take? 
f. Do the benefits actually exceed the costs of the implementation of actions in the short term, and 
are there longer term benefits? 
g. If actions are implemented all together what would be the difference? 
With the implementation of the framework of guiding principles and actions we aim to achieve good 
and sound outcomes in each pilot project, to clarify costs and benefits of implementation of guiding 
principles and actions, to identify the most important guiding principles and actions and if they should 
be implemented all together. 
The actions selected for inclusion in the pilot project action plans will need to be specified clearly, and 
information will be needed on: 
a. Brief description of the action, including which guiding principle it addresses 
b. Qualitative observations of key differences to standard or good practice for each TSO 
c. What is the specific desired outcomes and how it relates to the overarching desired outcomes 
Guiding	  
principle	  
Ac.on	  1	   In	  all	  pilots	  
Ac.on	  2	   In	  all	  pilots	  
Ac.on	  3	   In	  pilots	  X	  and	  Y	  
Ac.on	  4	   In	  pilots	  X	  and	  Y	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d. Time, staff and monetary resources needed for the implementation of the action 
e. Information from stakeholders on their perceptions of the action and its outcome  
f. Surveys in the context of workshops 
g. On-line surveys with participation of stakeholders from affected communities 
4. Review of historical cases 
This section introduces a set of case studies from infrastructure sectors such as renewable and non-
renewable energies as well as transport. The focus of the case studies is on actions which led to 
success or failure to address issues of public acceptance. Based on historical review, we develop 
recommendations and additional ideas for consideration of actions in designing pilot project action 
plans.  
4.1. Renewable energy infrastructure case studies 
Micro-generation is an interesting example as it requires an advanced form of public acceptance. It 
requires not only a passive agreement with construction of infrastructure but also an active 
acceptance by homeowners, whereby individual households become a part of electricity supply 
infrastructure. However, the passive acceptance of energy generation might change to resistance 
when it comes to more active form of acceptance in terms of willingness to pay for a higher share of 
renewable energy, or investing and potentially changing consumer behaviour (Sauter and Watson, 
2007). 
Another example is waste to energy power plant. The city of Thessaloniki, Greece, planned to build 
a Municipal Waste-to-Energy facility at the beginning of the 21st century. However, the project faced 
severe public opposition from local people. Additionally, application of direct thermal treatment 
requires heat consumption in a relative short distance for domestic and industrial consumers as well 
as the existence of adequate infrastructure for distribution of thermal energy and direct heating. The 
required of additional infrastructure resulted in an increased local community opposition to such 
investments (Achillas et al., 2011). 
The construction of the wind park in Welshpool, a Welsh village in Powys County, faced severe 
opposition from its inhabitants. In 2011 protesters came together to challenge renewable energy 
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developers and the UK National Grid company. The major reasons were, first, perceptions that the 
Powys county will not benefit directly from power produced by wind turbines. The second was 
perception that transmission lines and energy installations will destroy the beauty of the county 
(Williams, 2011). And the county council even called for a moratorium on all new wind-farm 
applications. This project became a subject of so-called NIMBY effect, when people support 
development of renewable energies in principle but object it near their homes as they see local 
detriment and no benefits (Pidgeon, 2012).  
The introduction of large size wind turbines in Greece, installed quickly in few restricted 
geographical areas, provoked serious reactions from local population led, which in some cases even 
led to complete cancellation of the wind power projects. Interestingly, the level of acceptance 
regarding the existing wind parks was relatively high, however, the majority of protests were directed 
against new installations. In order to study the public perceptions, a public survey was conducted with 
several representatives to identify the degree of public knowledge about wind energy applications, 
public awareness about environmental and macroeconomic impacts of wind energy and public attitude 
regarding new wind parks in view of the NIMBY effect (Kaldellis, 2005). 
Two surveys were conducted on the issues of public acceptance among communities of Greater 
Stavanger, Norway regarding the introduction of hydrogen vehicles as well as other modes of 
transportation relying on hydrogen such as public buses and passengers´ ferries. The research 
showed that even though the public had a positive attitude towards the hydrogen technology, the 
public acceptance decreased during the three years of the realization of the project (Tarigan and 
Bayer, 2012). 
In the Netherlands, which is a densely populated country, most people accept the need for expanding 
the transmission grids, but they do not want to have them in their backyard, so call NIMBY effect. The 
research work was conducted jointly by scientists and consultants on the issues of public acceptance 
for further construction of substations. TenneT, the Transmission System Operator in the Netherlands, 
wanted to be prepared for the discussion about further construction of substations and started a 
survey on how to deal with stakeholder needs in relation to substations (Wolsink, 2010). 
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4.2. Non-renewable energy infrastructure case studies 
There are also case studies on public acceptance from non-renewable energy sector like construction 
large infrastructure projects, particularly pipelines, in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The project to build the 
Lago Agrio Tank Farm and a 10 km pipelines was faced by severe public opposition. This situation 
could change due to stakeholder engagement and transparent information process (Benalcazar, 
2008). 
There are many studies on acceptance issues focused on projects where communities accepted new 
technologies like Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). However, in these studies the term 
‘acceptance’ often means actually no active protest and does not necessarily reflect community 
approval or support. The characteristics of such communities as well as best-practice public 
participation processes were studied in science. An example could be the case study of the Australia's 
Otway Project. Qualitative research methods were used to conduct a human and social capital 
analysis of the Otway community. An assessment of the project's public participation process was 
made in light of that analysis. The study found that the community needed capacity-building to enable 
it to become well-informed about CCS; and to help it develop the negotiation skills necessary to have 
the proponent address its concerns about the project in a timely manner. The Cooperative Research 
Centre for Greenhouse Gas Technologies (CO2CRC) Otway CCS project in Australia is one of the 
best know success stories where participation process positively influenced public acceptance 
(Ashworth et al., 2010).  On the surface the community accepted the Otway CCS project, mainly due 
to such factors as familiarity with gas technology and government legislation and policy regarding the 
exploration and extraction of resources. Gas wells and pipelines were already situated on the farmers 
properties. However, sympathy towards CCS technologies appeared to wane after preparation works 
for the project. Farmers felt being interrupted by repeated soil, water and seismic surveys. They were 
unprepared for frequency of these interruptions and inconvenience connected with it. The public 
opposition was driven by existing tensions between different groups of local population, such as 
farmers and newcomers, who did not really integrate locally. The culture of mistrust and the lack of 
cooperation with each other was influenced significantly by the previous failed experience to establish 
a wind farm in the region. The newcomers successfully opposed the project and the farmers lost 
considerable amount of potential income from the wind -mills to be situated on their grounds. For the 
project proponent this also created a challenge to identify the community leader who would carry on 
information and influence the public acceptance patterns. Also the newcomers were tired from the 
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participatory process for the wind mill, which took place only two years ago and showed the lack of 
interest to participate in the discussions (Anderson et al., 2010). 
4.3. Transport infrastructure case studies 
The construction of the Lyon-Turin segment of the European high-speed rail network was planned to 
take place in 1990s. However, it faced sever opposition from the side of inhabitants of the Susa Valley 
in Italy. The public acceptance of risk was influenced by characteristics of hazard, such as influence 
on environment and public health, and by the communicative approach. These characteristics of 
hazards were the proposed excavation of two major tunnels and possible spread of dangerous 
material as well as an increase in noise and electromagnetic pollution due to operations of high-speed 
train. The protests were so strong that they resulted in a so called “No TAV” movement (No Treno Alta 
Velocita) and led to demonstration parades, barricades, road and railway line blocks, strikes and 
scuffles with police (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009). 
In the second half of the twentieth century public acceptance of new highways in the US was eroded 
significantly by previous projects. Many of these projects were poorly conceived and insensitively 
implemented, when infrastructure community ignored its customers. And this lead to a situation when 
the construction of the highways in the US in the period 1970-1990 was faced by severe public 
opposition, especially regarding perceived high level of noise. For example, in Kentucky local 
authorities conducted several public meetings. They were very well attended but the authority 
underestimated the emotional component. They made only routine presentations at the same time as 
the opposition showed at this meeting a very well prepared documentation and slides about possible 
impacts of the highways. The contradiction between presentations given by officials and by opposition 
was so strong especially regarding its quality that it convinced the public to vote against the highways. 
At the same time another project of the Youngmann highway received positive reaction from public as 
the public authorities were much better prepared for communication (Cohn and Harris, 1988). 
The construction of Wilmington Bypass in North Carolina faced public opposition because of 
perceived impacts from the project on environment but due to a combination of measures to address 
public concerns it was possible to realize this project (Lane et al., 1998). Two other projects were less 
successful. The extend of an existing runway at the Örebro Airport, Sweden, and a new runway at 
Manchester Airport, UK, caused severe public opposition and several years of conflicts as the 
project developers failed to address the issues of public concerns (Soneryd and Weldon, 2003). 
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The expansion of the port of Rotterdam caused at the beginning public resistance due to perceived 
environmental impacts. However, after involvement of local stakeholders it became possible to realize 
the project (Palerm, 2006).  
Table 1: Historical cases of infrastructure projects 
Name of the case Year Journal reference Successful or not Guiding principle 
Micro-generation 2007 Sauter and 
Watson 
Yes Need 
Waste to energy 2011 Achillas et al., No Need, 
Environment 
Wind energy 
development in 
Wales 
2011 Cowell et al., Yes Benefit 
Wind park in 
Welshpool 
2012 Pidgeon  Benefits 
Large wind turbines 
in Greece 
2005 Kaldellis No Need 
Hydrogen vehicles 2008 
2012 
Heinz and 
Erdmann; 
Tarigan and 
Bayer 
No Need 
Transmission grids 2006 Vajjhala and 
Fischbeck 
Yes Benefits 
Oil pipelines 2008 Benalcazar Yes Accountability, 
Environment, 
Benefits 
Carbon Capture 
and Storage 
2010 
 
Ashworth Yes Need, 
Accountability, 
Engagement 
High-speed rail 
Lyon-Turin 
2009 Marincioni and 
Appiotti 
No Need, 
Environment 
Wilmington Bypass 
in North Carolina 
1998 Lane et al. Yes Environment 
Youngmann 
highway 
1988 Cohn Yes Environment 
Nashville highway 1999 Gifford Yes Environment 
Runway at Örebro 
Airport 
2003 Soneryd and 
Weldon 
No Environment 
Palm Beach airport 1988 Cohn No Environment 
Port of Rotterdam 2006 Palerm Yes Engagement 
Runway at 
Manchester Airport 
2006 Soneryd and 
Weldon 
No  
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5. The five guiding principles and their evidence in 
historical cases 
5.1. Need 
The information campaign on the Lyon-Turin High Speed Rail was problematic due to two factors. 
First, all news regarding the project were given in national and not local media. Second, the scientific 
findings on the impacts from rail project were not communicated to public at all. The perception of 
benefits from the Lyon-Turin High – Speed Rail was influenced by the mass media source, from where 
majority of inhabitants received information about the project. The majority of inhabitants received 
information about the project from local and regional newspapers or from participation at the local 
public meetings. At the same time their interest in mainstream national or international scientific 
sources was minimal. Therefore, it showed to be important to give news about the project on local 
media and not national one. In 2006 the risk analysis report of COWI engineering investigated in 
details the Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail project but the inhabitants of the Susa Valley were not aware 
of the existence of this report. At the same time a good benchmark example can be found on the 
French side of the high-speed rail project, where the new communicative approach lead to a very 
smooth public debate on the rail project. The national government from the very beginning established 
prompt and frank communications with local governments and residents of the territory affected by the 
railway. The early making of a personal viewpoint on risk showed to be especially important for the 
process of public-consensus-building.  
Besides other factors, such as high installation costs, the attitudes towards micro generation were 
influenced by the limited knowledge about them, which were connected with perceptions of dread risk. 
This resulted in a situation when consumers with limited knowledge about technology, took a “wait and 
see” attitude to investment. The historical review showed that there were two possible information 
campaign actions to solve this problem. The first one is on the source of information. The local and 
well-known mediators are more likely to have an impact on behavioural changes. Second, the 
information shall be continuous and it shall show exactly how technology works.  
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In the case of waste-to-energy the problems with public acceptance were mainly caused by the 
absence of clear understanding of gains from such projects to local communities. The major 
perception was that producing energy from waste does not price-compete with producing energy from 
fossil fuels (Miranda and Hale, 1997). Waste-to-Energy projects are also a strong subject to dread risk 
and availability heuristics as scientific evidence show that NIMBY syndrome for these types of projects 
becomes more intense for countries or areas that either do not have any similar previous experience 
or waste incineration and any other alternative was unsuccessfully implemented in the past. In the 
case of the Antonios WtE plant, the area is located to recently closed Tagarades landfill which was 
operating with significant deficiencies, which climaxed in fire lasting for 16 days. This negative 
experience caused negative availability heuristics towards the WtE project, even though the general 
attitude of local people is less critical towards integrated waste management schemes compared to 
waste landfill. The social concerns regarding WtE plant relate to health effects of incinerators 
emissions, potential accidents involving “toxic” waste, adverse impacts on quality of life and 
management of industrial waste. The terms like “dioxins”, “furans”, “toxic waste” created significant 
social concern. The recommendation on the possible action was to organize a dissemination 
campaign and to make available to public of all information regarding the ability of regulatory control to 
detect hazardous conditions, on appropriate emergency action plans, adequate technical expertise, 
competence of regulators and operators. The information campaign is also important as it seams that 
the lack of public information was regarded as a major reason for public protests. 
In the case of installation of new large wind turbines in Greece, the survey of public opinion found the 
existence of specific minority which was strongly against wind energy applications, disregarding any 
financial benefits of these projects. These were mainly farmers and stockbreeders. The survey 
showed that there resistance was caused to a large extent by the absence of any information 
regarding the projects and any information campaign to address their concerns. Therefore, the 
recommendation was to organize a targeted information campaign, especially for farmers and 
stockbreeders. 
In the case of CCS participatory activities information provision about the projects included such 
methods as articles in newspapers and the distribution of newsletters to prepare the community for the 
establishment of a project (Hance et al., 1990). The general-public communication about CCS and the 
Otway Project at the State and national levels occurred through CO2CRC website, which contained 
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information materials produced for local community, media releases and media interviews. The 
information activities also included newsletters, flyers, fact sheets, which were distributed to 1300 
community members a month before the community meeting with the project proponent. They were 
distributed through local community libraries and displayed at municipal offices. The information 
campaign also included the dissemination of results from a scientific research on inputs from CCS 
projects. The dissemination of results from this research influenced public perceptions of the Otway 
CCS project. But it was also a two-way interaction as the research also investigated public perceptions 
before and after the information campaign, therefore giving the stakeholders a chance to express their 
concerns. In the case when the community did not have information or knowledge about a project or a 
technology before means that the community has no reference to points of its own to check against 
the proponents´ information materials. This, as in the case of the Barendrecht CCS project, resulted in 
a situation when information came only from one source. The result was the community unrest about 
the project (Brunsting et al., 2010). 
The introduction of hydrogen vehicles in Greater Stavanger, Norway, was supported by extensive 
information campaign in media. It was extensively discussed and research by public authorities, 
energy scientists and industries. The discussions in mass media, such as Internet, radio, TV and 
newspaper, played a crucial role in influencing changes concerning public knowledge, attitudes and 
acceptance of hydrogen vehicles and related infrastructure. The greater knowledge among local 
population lowered the level of support for hydrogen energy, and the number of respondents who 
supported hydrogen vehicles decreased. In fact, gaining more knowledge lead also to a greater 
opposition as the media were discussing current and potential barriers for technology, infrastructure 
availability and the current price of fuels. These issues made respondents to be more realistic about 
the impacts of technology. Other, then information campaign, factors also played a role in the 
establishment of negative acceptance patterns. The development of hydrogen projects was very slow 
in Greater Stavanger. Since the project was launched, no additional development of hydrogen 
refuelling stations in the region took place, this influenced the level of confidence among communities. 
At the same time other sustainable fuels became more known in the region. The lack of the vision by 
the project in the long term might also influence negative dynamic. Additionally, expectations 
concerning support from partners such as auto industries, policymakers and research groups, did not 
fulfil. 
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5.2. Transparency 
An assessment of the Otway public participation process found that while it implemented the majority 
of best practice principles in public participation, it lacked an adherence to three: transparency, 
fairness and capacity (Anderson et al., 2011). 
The authors of the meta-study about public acceptance of non-renewable energy sources claim that a 
comprehensive and transparent stakeholder engagement strategy was developed to facilitate 
community participation and evaluation of the project. The stakeholders included local, regional and 
national government; community councils and associations; non-governmental and religious 
organizations; and individual landowners. Field visits were conducted, technical presentations were 
provided, formal and informal comments were solicited and workshops were conducted to arrive at a 
hybrid alternative with micro routing around areas of stakeholder concern. A key strategic decision 
was to maintain transparency throughout consultation process and flexibility in the final design, despite 
an atmosphere of continuous conflict stemming from another recently constructed pipeline in region. 
The affected communities also participated directly in construction monitoring and environmental and 
social compliance assessment. Due to the high level of community acceptance and proactive 
environmental approach the pipelines were constructed in 2003 with no public controversy and have 
been operating to date without incidents and without any complaint about the stakeholder strategy and 
methodology (Benalcazar and Thurber, 2008).  
In the case of Lago Agio project the negotiations with local communities followed a well-known 
transparency principle that the negotiation process should be first defined by the needs of general 
public and not by government and local political leaders. The negotiations took place first with local 
communities and only then local government could provide their opinion. Negotiation with public was 
especially important regarding identification of routes for pipelines. The project developers identifies 
thirteen possible routes and during the transparent negotiation process public could express their 
opinion regarding each of the routes, especially regarding such questions as demographies, 
infrastructure, environmental sensitivities and urban growth plans. The best three alternatives were 
selected based on consultations with local public, technical staff from municipalities, representatives 
from regulatory authorities, some informal groups and local church. Project developers also involved 
two critical stakeholders from local communities who participated in all meetings with public 
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authorities. These individuals functioned as witnesses of transparency in negotiation processes 
(Benalcazar, 2008).  
5.3. Engagement 
In the case of the Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail the central government of Italy failed to involve local 
administrative bodies into the planned stage of the high-speed rail project. The project was included 
into the Strategic Infrastructure Act, which is managed at the national level. The lack of early 
involvement of local stakeholders lead to protests against the project, which were also combined with 
protests against the national government and a wish to defend the territory from the national and the 
European Union influence and globalization processes. Later on, the protest demonstrations against 
the project were joined by local and non-local antagonist collectives such as No-Global and 
Autonomia. As solution the national government withdrew the project from the Strategic Infrastructure 
Act and moved it under legislation of the ordinary legislative framework for public infrastructures, 
which provides a greater involvement of local authorities. Secondly, the independent entity called 
“Lyon-Turin Environmental Observatory” was established with the goal to facilitate dialog among 
various high-speed rail stakeholders. The stakeholders from national, regional and local government 
formed this entity. After more than 70 meetings the Observatory developed recommendations for 
design of new railway tracks and a new transport policy for the territory.  
In the case of Otway CCS project participatory activities included workshops with the intention to 
reach agreement on possible issues of concern, such as traffic management, noise and dust 
mitigation during construction phases. The major involvement of public took place at the community 
meetings. The meetings were announced a month in advance by local radio and newspapers. The 
local community, as well as politicians from the State and federal levels were invited to attend the 
meetings. The questions and responses from meetings were published in the project newsletters. 
Another case study on patters of public acceptance has also its focus on the CCS in Australia and 
presents the findings of an engagement process using facilitated workshops conducted in two 
communities in rural Queensland, Australia, where a demonstration project for IGCC with CCS has 
been announced. The findings demonstrate that workshop participants were concerned about climate 
change and wanted leadership from government and industry to address the issue. After the 
workshops, participants reported increased knowledge and more positive attitudes towards CCS, 
expressing support for the demonstration project to continue in their local area (Ashworth et al., 2010). 
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A new organizational form of public involvement allowed a successful realization of the project on the 
extension of the port of Rotterdam. The public participation was mandatory from the start of the 
project. However, it was not successful as it failed to provide an opportunity for stakeholders to 
influence the design of the project. Even worse, the consultation meetings between civil society 
organizations, government and project developers lead only to the escalation of the conflict. One of 
the solutions for this conflict was to involve a respected ex-politician as a mediator. Another solution 
was to organize a committee, which had an independent chair and gave to stakeholders an 
opportunity to discuss all strategic questions. This solution allowed to minimize conflicts and to create 
environment leading to solutions acceptable for everybody. The third solution was to enable civil 
society organizations to take responsibility and to help find solutions. Thus, a joint fact-finding took 
place where civil society organizations and governmental organizations participated. This fact - finding 
resulted in an advisory study about the possibilities for compensating loss of natural values in affected 
areas and the definition of adequate compensation measures for affected protected areas. 
5.4. Environment 
In the case of waste-to-energy projects public opposition was connected to perceptions of dangerous 
effects on health and environment. The recommendations to address these concerns were to 
establish day-to-day monitoring of the plant, which shall be backed up by strict enforcement, even 
including the shut down of the plant for violation of designed standards. 
Gifford (1999) argues that for successful implementation of highways projects a survey of public 
opinion is essential as it is essential to understand what customers´ value and will support. And one of 
the major public concerns is increased influenced from highway projects on environment and health. 
These concerns range from air quality to land use, community separation, to erosion of viable markets 
for public transit. Public awareness about these externalities increased significantly and with this 
increase their willingness to accept highway projects significantly declined. Another explanation for the 
decreasing level of public acceptance is dissatisfaction with facilities being tendered for construction. 
These facilities failed to refine and adapt their design according to the expectations from public. 
In the case of the Youngmann highway public authorities conducted prior meetings with public 
extensive surveys with inhabitants of the affected communities to understand better their needs. 
Based on these surveys, they identified that the major issue of concern was connected to possible 
noise from the highway. During the public meetings authorities showed a well-prepared movie about 
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how the level of noise can be reduced with the help of special barriers. Further on, additional 
investment was done to construct the barriers. 
In the cased of four forty highway in Nashville the interaction process with public was much more 
lengthy and at the beginning the opposition to the project was much stronger than in the case of the 
Youngmann highway. The issue of concern was also connected with the possible high level of noise. 
The department of Tennessee conducted several studies of possible noise impacts and even sent the 
specialists to conduct large-scale models in the uniquely outfitted laboratory in Japan as a part of 
feasibility study for absorptive noise barriers.  There were several public meetings as well as the 
meetings with research team in different locations. The format of these meetings was different. The 
started with 20 minutes presentations, followed by one hour exhibition on design and construction 
activities, principles of noise, modelling techniques, noise measurements, including before and after 
audio tapes, photos of representative noise barriers. Afterwards there was a session with questions 
and answers. The meetings were combined with extensive media coverage and the noise team 
members were often guests at the local talk shows.    
To address public concerns in the case of the Wilmington Bypass the government commissioned a 
feasibility study including an environmental impact assessment. This study was then presented to 
public for negotiation and feedback. The study contained four possible routings. After consultation with 
public the forth alternative was abolished because of its impacts on wetlands, forest lands, cultural 
resources and low traffic utilization potentials. As a result, two alternatives were considered as feasible 
and were further evaluated regarding their environmental impacts. However, one of the remaining 
alternatives caused again public opposition, as the residents in the vicinity of the planned highway felt 
that they were not sufficiently involved into the decision-making process and the project developers 
were event accused in some racial disparities. As a response to these accusations a new Wilmington 
Bypass public involvement process was conducted.  It included an informational workshop those 
objective was to collect information from communities with the help of questionnaires, which contained 
questions related to neighbourhood, ranking evaluation factors in order of their importance, asking 
which projects affect the respondent the most and why. The evaluation factors included air quality, 
community cohesion, noise, visual impacts, water resources and other. To avoid accusations in racial 
discrimination the datasets from interviews were selected in a way that they contained equal number 
of respondents from all national and racial groups. The second stage of stakeholders´ involvement 
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included project development meetings where everybody was welcome to participate. The meetings 
were designed to encourage residents of local communities to participate in the project development 
process. Also each community could nominate a person who would act as a liaison between 
community and project developers and will generate effective feedback between affected community 
and project team.  After the first set of meetings all concerns were reviewed and the adjusted plans 
were presented at the second row of meetings. During the second row of meetings inhabitants had a 
chance to discuss the developed mitigation measures to address concerns raised during the first set 
of meetings. These mitigation measures included design revisions, landscape plans, sidewalk 
provisions, noise attenuation features. 
In the case of the extension of an existing runway at the Örebro Airport the airport company provided 
an environmental impact study that the extension will not imply any serious impact for environment 
and humans. However, the local inhabitants mistrusted this assessment as the company failed to 
involve local stakeholders into the discussion about impacts from the project, nobody asked their 
opinion and there was no possibility to influence the process. The local people were not regarded as 
experts and their direct experience was not translated into the language of the expert system. There 
were stakeholders meeting but general public was not invited and it was difficult to find information 
about them. The person from the airport company who came to talk to local people used technical 
terms, which were difficult for understanding. Also, people feared that the calculations made by the 
company are incorrect as these were mainly theoretical calculations because the real measurements 
are very expensive and time consuming and there was no alternative method to compare these 
results. The correct calculation would give to local people also a chance to receive compensation in 
some form if the exposure of their houses to decibel levels is higher than applicable limits. The local 
people hired a layer to request from the company a soundproofing for additional 23 houses and an 
additional costs of 0.5-1 million Euro. The local people also demanded a limitation on the number of 
flights during the night time. 
In the case of the new runway for the Manchester Airport the company provided an environmental 
impact study with details on the possible loss of wildlife and countryside. The Secretaries of State for 
Transport and the Environment approved the application after a nine-month public inquiry. As in the 
case with Örebro Airport, the airport company failed to involve stakeholders. Indeed, the local 
stakeholders were invited to meetings and they could express their opinion but then their arguments 
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were not taken into consideration as their were regarded as less important than scientific and 
professional arguments. This inability to take into account contextual local knowledge forced local 
stakeholders to employ legal and scientific experts to frame their arguments. This case shows that 
public participation was regarded only as a one-way information transfer, from experts to public. If a 
greater emphasis would be placed on the two-way communication, it would result in better information 
about possible impacts from the project. 
In the case of Palm Beach airport public authority undertook a special feasibility study where the major 
component was the public involvement phase. The study was conducted by a team of specialists from 
four different organizations. The team established a large number of citizen´s committees those major 
aim was to ensure that all interested stakeholders could provide inputs into the development of the 
abatement analysis scenario. Most of these committees met monthly and representatives of mass 
media were also present at these meetings. Additionally, the team established a 24-hours telephone 
line for the case of complaints about aircraft operations. One public meeting took place in the middle 
of the realization of the project. The meeting lasted for seven hours and did not include any formal 
presentations but included several information stations. One of the stations included slides 
presentations about the feasibility study, which was planned throughout the overall meeting. Citizens 
were able to give comments by speaking directly to stenographer. As results of feasibility study an 
additional noise staff member was hired, a permanent noise monitoring system was installed and 
night-time restrictions on noisy aircraft operations were introduced. All these measures improved 
public perceptions of the airport project and reduced the organized opposition.  
In the case of Lago Agrio project the community was engaged into the dialogue with project 
developers on identification of the best and less intrusive pipeline route as well as on identification and 
application of environmental standards for pipeline construction and operation. The discussion on 
environmental impacts included stakeholders from civil society, community leaders, environmental 
groups, local authorities and the church.   
Perceptions of environmental and health impacts from the Lyon-Turin High-Speed Rail were 
influenced by the dread hazards of uranium mining and asbestos insulation necessary for construction 
of two railway tunnels in Susa Valley. These two hazards were perceived as a high risk, as the more 
dreaded and unknown is a hazard, the higher it is perceived as a risk and the greater is the public 
demand for corrective actions to reduce the threat (Slovic, 1985). Availability heuristics was another 
  
 
 
 
22 
cognitive bias, which influenced public perceptions regarding the project. The problems of atmospheric 
pollution, along with natural and industrial contamination of water and soil are not new in the Susa 
valley and the rail project refocused immediately public attention to the old and new environmental 
issues. The valley was already exposed to all undesirable fallout of large industrial concentrations 
from Turin. Additionally, the Susa Valley is vulnerable and experienced several natural hazards like 
floods and landslides and inhabitants perceived that the rail project will increase vulnerability of the 
valley to these hazards. The correction of the dread risk and availability heuristics lays in the principle 
of “trust in communicator” (Slovic, 2000). If the trust in sources of communication of risk is high, then 
even little or poorly substantiated information will come into view as convincing. Hence, early dialog 
with local stakeholders, especially with local newspapers, was crucial to diffuse understanding of risks 
from the project based on scientific evidence. 
5.5. Benefits 
In the case of TenneT and construction of new substations, the interviews with local stakeholders such 
as asset owners and local authorities showed that acceptance of substations in terms of landscape 
integration will increase if alternatives are available, especially if some of these alternatives offer 
added value (through public functions) or are better suited to the surrounding area. The research 
found out that If TenneT can show the various stakeholders that several alternatives have been 
investigated and can convince them that TenneT really wants to act as a "good neighbour", it will be 
able to reduce the initial resistance. Therefore, one of the recommendations would be to introduce 
feasible alternatives for various landscape types, including urban areas. These alternatives should 
also provide additional benefits to local communities. As an answer to this recommendation a 
catalogue or sketchbook describing concepts and practical examples of how to integrate the electrical 
installation into its environment. 
In the case of the wind park in Welshpool the project developers failed to share benefits with local 
communities, such as to offer communities material local benefits in return for hosting facilities or 
through various community-driven renewable-project co-ownerships, and as result the project did not 
take place. Offering co-ownership could be an efficient way to improve public perceptions of the 
project. For example, in Scotland on the Isle of Gigha a wind-energy project is now owned and 
operated by community. This ownership structure had positive effects on public acceptance from the 
side of local population.  
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In the case of Lago Agio project developers and local government, including local mayor, city council 
and some representatives of civil society, negotiated a large compensation project for local community 
with development and social orientation. This involved construction of a public market building 
following the design requirements from municipality. The selected version of public market came out of 
possible alternatives discussed with local stakeholders. Additionally, project developers agreed to 
provide all non-skilled and some skilled job opportunities to local communities and to optimize 
utilization of local services such as transportation, catering and others. 
 
6. Recommendations: the five guiding principles and sets 
of actions in historical cases 
6.1 ‘Need’ 
The historical cases showed that the following actions contributed to public acceptance based on the 
principle of information sharing and explaining the needs to new infrastructure: 
a. Information published in local media, such as media campaign including local or international 
media source, dependently on preferences from stakeholders 
b. Transformation of scientific knowledge and its adaptation to public needs, publication of results 
from scientific research 
c. Engagement of local and well-known mediators to report about the project to overcome 
perceptions connected with dread risk or negative past experience 
d. Clear communication of goals and gains of the project 
e. Dissemination campaign about the work of regulators and government to control possible risks 
f. Special targeted campaign for separate groups of stakeholders 
g. One-way information campaign, including regular newsletters about the project, flyers and 
factsheets 
h. Information campaigns in Internet and new social media 
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i. Two-way information communication where community and project team learn about concerns 
from each other, including questions and answers sessions, community meetings, interactive 
websites, feedback questionnaires 
6.2  ‘Transparency’ 
The guiding principle of accountability and transparency means to ensure that community is aware of 
all practices and risks connected with the project and also to ensure that the major stakeholders and 
public understand the process of implementation of the project and their role in the public participation 
process. The historical cases showed that the following actions contributed to public acceptance 
based on the principle of transparency: 
a. Principle of talking to general public first and then to local government and politicians 
b. Nomination of a representative from community who would watch all negotiations and meetings 
c. Participation of community in monitoring of construction 
d. Participation of community in environmental and social compliance assessment 
e. Publishing of results from meetings in national and local media 
f. Transparency throughout consultation process and flexibility in final design 
6.3 ‘Engagement’ 
One limitation of the stakeholder involvement process is that stakeholders involved into decision-
making might be self-selected and can have strong personal interests or be biased for particular 
solutions. To overcome this limitation there are different actions for public involvement. The historical 
cases showed that public acceptance issues can be addressed successfully through the following 
actions for public involvement: 
	  
a. Involvement of local administrative bodies into planning process as equal partners to the national 
bodies 
b. Establishment of an independent entity to facilitate dialogue with stakeholders at local, national 
and regional levels such as project task forces to meet with opposition leaders in privacy and to 
work out compromise solutions 
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c. Organization of a committee with an independent chair and opportunity for all parties to discuss 
strategic decisions such as citizen´s committees to access and utilize knowledge of citizen´s on 
the project and to answer concerns 
d. Workshops to reach agreement on possible issues of concern 
e. Community meetings such as public meetings with participation of high level officials 
f. Consultation meetings such as three-parts meetings with presentations about the project, 
information stations and questions-answers sessions, including audio /video/slide presentations 
played continuously at the information station 
g. Information stations with possibility of one-to-one discussion with project team members 
h. Organization of votes on certain issues and the willingness of involved partners to give serious 
attention to the results of the votes 
i. Joint fact – finding studies with involvement of local community, project developers and 
government  
j. Opinion surveys on opinion and needs of affected citizen give a sense of personal involvement 
into the project 
k. Dedicated telephone numbers, which are largely advertised and give an opportunity for 
complaints. However, it is important that all inquiries are answered properly by return call or in 
writing 
l. Involvement of respected ex-politician as a mediator 
As the stakeholders´ involvement or public participation in and acceptance of routing decisions for 
electric transmission lines has delayed and prevented the construction of numerous lines in recent 
decades, there are scientific works developing recommendations how to address it. One is a new 
method of public participation called structured public involvement (SPI). The method was developed 
previously for routing other public infrastructure, but can be adapted to routing electric transmission 
lines. SPI elicits and quantifies community values then routes the line according to these values and 
best engineering design practices. The process is done before any potential routes are ever 
considered by the transmission company and routing professionals, effectively allowing the public, in 
collaboration with experts, to determine the line route. This reduces the chances of line routing failure 
by simplifying the project and greatly accelerating the complex problem of comparing alternate line 
routes, and it facilitates public acceptance of a final route (Jewell et al., 2009). 
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6.4 ‘Environment’ 
One of the explanations for the decline in public consensus regarding energy and transport 
infrastructure is an increasing public concern about social and environmental impacts. The principle of 
environment protection stems, among others, from the EU commitment to conserving biodiversity, 
which is based on such legal frameworks as Natura 2000, providing habitats for endangered species, 
Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive. The need of public participation as a tool to ensure 
environmental protection is also recognized by the international policies (UN 1992; EC 2000), which 
underline the value of local knowledge in the environmental decision-making. 
a. Joint fact-finding study with NGOs, governmental organizations and project developers on impacts 
on environment and human health 
b. Chaired committee to bring stakeholders from business, civil society and government to discuss 
possible impacts on environment and human health and to find acceptable to all solutions 
c. Establishment of day-to-day monitoring of the project 
d. Public surveys on perceptions of environmental risks 
e. Movies about measures to control environmental risks 
f. Feasibility studies with environmental impact assessment including feedback from local people as 
well as from experts 
g. Ranking of environmental risks based on perceptions from local stakeholders about important of 
this risk and its possibility to happen 
h. Public meetings and workshops to discuss environmental risks 
6.5. ‘Benefits’ 
The principle of sharing the benefits from new infrastructure is often connected with social learning. It 
means that when infrastructure starts to contribute to social and economic well-being, stakeholders 
learn to recognize and to realize the benefits from this new infrastructure. The social learning often 
requires from stakeholders to adapt to the new situation in order to be able to profit from new 
infrastructure. Thus, the evolution of social acceptance based on sharing benefits from new 
infrastructure can be also understood as a learning process. 
a. To offer local stakeholders to choose from several alternatives for various landscape types, 
including urban areas or to integrate measures to improve landscape 
b. Material benefits for local communities in exchange for hosting facilities 
  
 
 
 
27 
c. Co-ownership by local communities of projects and installations 
d. Large compensation projects with social and development orientation 
e. Employment of local people for all non-skilled and as much as possible skilled jobs 
f. Optimized utilization of local services 
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